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A cotenancy is a tenancy that arises when two or more persons be-
come seized of property in such a manner that they have an undivided
possession, but several freeholds.2 One must be entitled to possession
of the common property to be a cotenant and the ownership and right
to possession must extend to the entire property.2 At common law
there were four distinct estates of cotenancy: (1) joint tenancy; (2)
tenancy by the entirety; (3) estates in coparcenary; (4) tenancy in
common.
ESTATES IN COPARCENARY
An estate in coparcenary or parcenary arose at common law when,
on the death of the owner of an estate of inheritance, it descended
to two or more female heirs, in default of a male heir, and likewise
1. 14 A. JuiL, Cotenancy § 6 (1938).
2. BA x7TnNz, LAW DicnoNARY (2nd ed. 1948).
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when, by local custom, land descended to two or more male heirs.3
Generally in the United States there is no distinction today between
this estate and the estate of tenancy in common. 4 Although this
estate is mentioned in the SOUTH CAROLINA CoDE ov LAWS, 5 South
Carolina appears to be in line with the majority in not recognizing it
as this writer has been unable to find any cases where such an estate
has been construed.
TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
Tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership of
husband and wife, which is based upon the common law concept that
the husband and wife are one person. The estate can exist only if
title to land is acquired jointly by a husband and wife. Each spouse
is considered owner of the entire estate because of the common law
concept of unity of husband and wife. The South Carolina Supreme
Court in Davis v. Davis0 construed the Married Women's Property
Act7 as abolishing this estate.
JOINT TENANCY
THi ESTAT4 AT COMMON LAW
At common law joint tenancy was an estate held by two or more
persons jointly with equal rights to share in its enjoyment during
their lives. It had as its distinguishing feature, the right of survivor-
ship by virtue of which the entire estate, upon the death of any of
the joint tenants, went to the survivors, and so on to the last survivor,
who took an estate of inheritance free and exempt from all charges
made by his deceased cotenants. A joint tenancy could only be cre-
ated by grant or devise and never by way of descent or other act of
law. Creditors had no recourse against the decedent's interest in the
joint property. Dower did not attach.8
The essential elements of a joint tenancy were and still are: (1)
unity of interest, (2) unity of title, (3) unity of time, and (4) unity
of possession. This means that the tenants must have one and the
same interests; the interests must accrue by one and the same con-
veyance; they must commence at one and the same time; and the
property must be held by one and the same undivided possession. 9
3. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 429 (3rd ed. 1939).
4. TiFrANY, REAL PROPERTY 429 (3rd ed. 1939).
5. § 31-55 (1952).
6. 223 S. C. 182,75 S. E. 2d 46 (1953).
7. CODF oi LAWS OP SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 20-201 through 20-203 (1952).
8. 14 Am. JuR., Cotenancy § 6 (1938).
9. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 1 Mills' Const. 48 (S. C. 1817).
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Tenants are seized of the entire estate for the purposes of tenure and
survivorship, but only a particular part or interest for the purpose
of immediate alienation.
None but natural persons can take in joint tenancy.10
THE EsTATE As MODIVIED By STATUTE
In 1791 the General Assembly enacted the following statute :'1
When any person shall be, at the time of his death, seized or
possessed of any estate in joint tenancy the same shall be adjudg-
ed to be severed by the death of the joint tenant and shall be
distributable as if the same were a tenancy in common.
This statute is applicable, not only to legal interests, but to equitable
ones as well,' 2 but does not apply to trustees.'3 The purpose of this
statute was to abolish the harsh survivorship rule which "in almost
every instance defeats the intention"' 4 of the testator or grantor.
Unfortunately the abolition was not complete and there remained
limited areas which were not affected and the survivorship rule still
applied. The Court in Herbemont v. Thomas,'5 in construing this
Act and earlier ones which have since disappeared from our statutes,
stated that title by joint tenancy is well known to our laws. The
Acts "simply regulate and modify its qualities in certain cases; in all
of which they contemplate, as a prerequisite to their own operation,
that the interest upon which they .are to operate shall have actually
vested." (writer's emphasis)
By applying the "vested" test of Herbentont v. Thomas it can be
seen from the following limitations that the survivorship rule might
still apply in certain areas:
1. Contingent Remainders - "A to B for life, remainder to C, and
his heirs if he survives B, but if C does not survive B to D and E and
their heirs." What if C were to predecease B but D had died prior
to the vesting of the remainder? Since D died before the vesting of
the remainder would the survivorship rule apply as to his share?
2. Executory Interests - "A to B and his heirs but if B dies without
children over to C and D and their heirs." What if B died without
children but C predeceased him? Would the Court construe C's
10. Telfair v. Howe, 3 Rich. Eq. 235 (S. C. 1851).
11. Act of 1791 (CODE OF LAws OF SoUTH CAaOLINA § 19-55 (1952).)
12. McMeeldn v. Brummet, 2 Hilt's Eq. 638 (1837).
13. Karesh, Devolution of Interests in Trust Estates, 1 S. C. L. Q., 411
(1949).
14. Free v. Sandifer 131 S. C. 232, 126 S. E. 521 (1925).
15. Cheves' Eq. 21 (S. C. 1839).
[Vol. 1I
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interest as having vested prior to the defeasance of B's estate within
the meaning of the term as used in Herbemont v. Thomas?'
6
In addition to these possibilities, the Court has specifically held, or
by way of dicta intimated, that survivorship would apply or the
estate of the disqualified joint tenant would vest in the remaining
joint tenants in the following cases:
1. A devise to two parties as joint tenants where one of the devisees
predeceases the devisor.'
7
2. A devise to two parties, one of whom did not exist.' 8
3. A conveyance by the grantor to several grantees, one of whom was
the grantor (a conveyance by a grantor to himself is void at common
law).3.9
It is apparent that in the areas outlined above, in spite of the
statutory prohibition of the rule of survivorship as set forth in §
19-55 supra, the common law estate of joint tenancy with its attendant
rule of jus accrescendi may very well be of importance in South Caro-
lina. It is therefore necessary to consider what language is required
to form an estate in joint tenancy.
NECEssARY PERASEOLOGY To FoRm THE ESTATE
Joint tenancy was favored over the tenancy in common by the early
common law because the latter estate tended to split up the feudal
services and hence disorganize the feudal military system. With
the passing of the feudal period and the accompanying social
need for such an estate there was a gradual trend of judicial sympathy
toward the estate of tenancy in common and away from that of
joint tenancy with its harsh survivorship rule.
Herbemont v. Thomas, supra, laid down the rule that joint tenancy
will be admitted only where there are no words that will point to a
tenancy in common. The slightest words will be seized upon by the
Court to construe a tenancy in common but there must be some ex-
pression of intent in order to support such construction. The Court
in this instance was ruling on a limitation devising and bequeathing
16. The language of § 19-55 affects the survivorship rule only as to one seized
or possessed of any estate in joint tenancy. The term estate is defined in
BALSNTINE, LAW DICTIONARY, (2 ed. 1948) as referring, in its primary and
technical sense, only to an estate in land. If such a construction were given
to it in this instance it would be readily apparent that this statute would not
apply to joint tenancies in chattels and that the common law rule of jus accre-
scendi or survivorship would still apply in that area. Apparently, however, the
technical construction was not intended by the Legislature because § 19-55 is
a section of the Descent and Distribution Statute and in the first section
§ 19-52, of this Statute the phrase "estate, real and personal" is used.
17. Herbemont v. Thomas, supra.
18. Telfair v. Howe, 3 Rich. Eq. 235 (S. C. 1851).
19. Green v. Cannady, 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. B. 832 (1907).
4
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"the remaining four-tenths to my four nieces", and determined that
the nieces held as joint tenants as there was nothing to show any
intent not to create a joint tenancy. Ball v. Deas,2o in construing a
similar limitation, followed the rule laid down in the Herbeinont case.
The rule of construction in this area was liberalized in Telfair v.
Howe. 23- Though dual grounds were found to hold that no joint
tenancy was created, the Court squarely faced the problem of a con-
structional issue in the following limitation: "I direct my executors
to pay over the residue of my estate, or bonds, or money, to the
American Bible Society of New York, and to the Missionary Society
of New York, to whom I leave or bequeath it." There was no such
organization as the Missionary Society of New York, and the re-
maining devisee, The American Bible Society, claimed the entire
estate as the surviving joint tenant. Though admitting the fact that
the surviving devisee's right to take both shares of the estate would
not be barred by the Act of 179122 if this was joint tenancy, it
was found that no joint tenancy was created:
I have before adverted to the tendency, or leaning, (as the phrase
is) of courts in modern times, - particularly Courts of Equity,
- to avail themselves of any strong equitable circumstances, or
of any words employed by the testator in his will, that would
imply a severance, to give such a construction, as would make
the estate a tenancy in common, and not a joint tenancy. It
is always a question of construction, and the object is to get at
the intention of the testator; which must, however, be done in
conformity with the established rules of interpretation. (writer's
emphasis)
In spite of the italicized portion, the established rule of interpretation,
that there must be some expression of intent not to create a joint
tenancy, as laid down in Herbemont v. Thomas and followed in Ball
v. Deas seems to have been overlooked. The Court, in citing the
example of the English courts in not permitting the trustees of an
executory trust, when conveying the corpus of the trust, to defeat
the intention of the settlor, held that an analogous situation existed
and, where the intention was apparent, the Court should mould the
construction "so as best to answer the intent of the testator."
A further development of the rule of construction was propounded
in Green v. Cannady.23 There, one Betsy Maddox conveyed by
20. 2 Strob. Eq. 24 (S. C. 1848).
21. 3 Rich. Eq. 235 (S. C. 1851).
22. CoD OF LAWS or SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-55 (1952).
23. 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. E. 832 (1907).
[Vol. 11
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deed "unto Thomas Cannady, Jane Cannady, Nancy Maddox and
Betsy Maddox their heirs and assigns forever." The issue was,
could the grantor, Betsy Maddox, convey to herself and if not, what
share did the other grantees take? The Court in quoting from 13
Cyc., 527 which in turn was quoting from Shepherd's Touchstone,
cited the following rule of law:
If a deed be made to one that is incapable and to others that are
capable, in this case it shall enure only to him that is capable
(And if they were to be joint tenants, the person who is capable
shall take the whole; but if they were to be tenants in common,
he shall have only his particular share.)
In determining the intention of the grantor the Court went outside
the "four corners'* of the deed and went into a detailed discussion of
the relationship of the parties in order to arrive at a proper construc-.
tion of the limitation.
It is manifest that the grantor did not intend to convey the whole
estate to the parties named other than herself, and that her pur-
pose was to remain owner of some interest in the premises ...
The circumstances that the house upon the lot was built by the
united efforts of all the parties, that after the conveyance they
all lived on the premises and used the fruits of their joint labors
as one family, all harmonize with a construction which regards
the deed as creating a tenancy in common among the grantor
and the grantees in equal proportions.
In 1925 the rule of construction in this area was further liberalized
in Free v. Sandifer.2 4 There the Court was construing a devise to
Howard B. and Thelma L. Sandifer of tract No. 1 "for and during
the term of their natural lives and from and immediately after their
death, to their children living and in case they should leave no chil-
dren living at their death, then the said tract of land to become the
property of my other children and grandchildren living at that time."
In construing the estate created by the devise as one of tenancy in
common rather than of joint tenancy, the following was said:
It seems perfectly clear from the wording of the will that a joint
tenancy with the right of survivorship was never intended by
the testatrix. The word "joint', as to ownership, was not
mentioned, nor is the word "survivor" to be found in the will.
(writer's emphasis)
24. 131 S. C. 232, 126 S. E. 521 (1925).
19591
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After pointing out that both of these words are apt ones to create
an estate in joint tenancy, the Court went on to say that even stronger
intention was demonstrated by the limitation of the estate after the
"falling in of the life estate."
Surely the testatrix did not intend that the children of Howard,
should any be born to him, should be compelled to await the death
of Thelma before coming into possession of their remainder, if
Thelma lived 30 or 40 years after the death of Howard. Her
evident intention was that the remainder should vest immediate-
ly upon the death of either life tenant.
After further decreasing the vitality of the estate which "presents
some of the most artificial rules of subtle distinctions of the ancient
common law"25 by remarking on the absence of such words as "joint"
or "survivor" as indicating an absence of intent to create an estate
of joint tenancy, the Court by unfortunate dictum, and apparently
ignoring the Green and Telfair decisions, remarked that had the
limitation in this case not been distinguishable from those in the
Herbemont and Ball cases by the addition of the remainder interest,
it would have been bound by the precedent established by them.
In spite of this unhappy retrogression by way of dictum, further
progress was made in the next case presented to the Court requiring
a construction of a similar limitation. In Davis v. Davis20 there
was a devise to James H. Davis, 36 acres; to Elizabeth Jane Davis,
36 acres; to John Q. Davis, 36 acres; and to Drucilla Sarah Davis
and Rachael Ann Davis, jointly, the residue of 74 acres.
If any of his children above mentioned should die without
children, then their share of said real estate herebefore mention-
ed should go to the heirs of children of such as at the time may
be living, and provided that the real estate as an entirety to
descend to his legal grandchildren independent of all claims, and
that his legal grandchildren should inherit, after the death of his
children, the same as his own children.
Rachael Ann Davis predeceased her father and was unmarried at
the time of her death, and Drucilla Sarah Davis died childless after
the testator's death. In an action for partition the Court, completely
ignoring the word "jointly", cited Free v. Sandifer, supra, as author-
ity for construing the italicized portion of the above limitation as
a tenancy in common and held the interest of Rachael had become
25. Telfair v. Howe, 3 Rich. Eq. 235 (. C. 1851).
26. 144 S. C. 205, 142 S. E. 496 (1927).
[Vol. 11
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intestate property, and, upon the testator's death, vested in the heirs
of the testator, while the interest of Drucilla vested, under the terms
of the will in the testator's grandchildren in being at the time of her
death.
As can be seen from the preceding cases, although the Court
still professes to recognize the existence of the estate of joint tenancy,
the rule of construction has come the full circle: from there hav-
ing to be some expression of intent in order to support a construction
of a tenancy in common in Herbernont v. ThoaS;2 7 to going outside
the instrument and investigating the relationship of the parties im-
mediately preceding the writing of the instrument in Green v. Can-
nady;2 8 to remarking on the absence of words such as "joint" and
"survivor" as showing a lack of intent to form the estate of joint
tenancy in Free v. Sandifer;2 9 to, when faced with the word "jointly"
in the limitation, ignoring it upon a finding of a contrary intention
of the testator in Davis v. Davis.
3 0
Although Herbemont v. Thomas and Ball v. Deas have not been
e-xpressly overruled, the Court has refused to construe any estate
one of joint tenancy, at least where survivorship affected the outcome
of the distribution of the estate, for over one hundred years. If the
precise issue presented in these two cases is brought before the Court
in the future it is possible that it will hold that the cases discussed
above furnish sufficient authority to justify a finding that they have
been overruled, thereby foreclosing the possibility of the estate of
joint tenancy, with its attendant rule of survivorship, being applied
as a matter of law, contrary to the intention of the testator or grantor.
For whatever may have been the causes which led to the origin
of this estate, or which recommended it to our rude and warlike
ancestors of the feudal period, it is undeniable that, at this day,
it has grown into disfavor in English and American Courts
31
But what if there is an intention, expressed in unequivocal terms,
to create such an estate for the purpose of having the survivorship
rule apply? If faced with such a limitation as, "to A and B as joint
tenants and I intend that the rule of survivorship apply", what con-
struction would the Court place upon it? As pointed out earlier,
survivorship is abolished as a feature of joint tenancy by our present
27. Cheves' Eq. 21 (S. C. 1839).
28. 77 S. C. 195, 57 S. E. 832 (1907).
29. 131 S. C. 232, 126 S. E. 521 (1925).
30. 144 S. C. 205, 142 S. E. 496 (1927).
31. Telfair v. Howe, 3 Rich. Eq. 235 (S. C. 1851).
19591
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Code Section 19-55. The testator's intention as expressed in the
limitation above would be thwarted in all except the isolated areas
that are not affected by the statute. In these areas not affected the
Court may construe the estate as one of joint tenancy and thereby
effectuate the grantor's will or it may choose another method, dis-
cussed in the succeeding paragraph, to accomplish the same result.
In situations where the interest of the parties was vested and sur-
vivorship would come under the proscription of § 19-55, most surely
the limitation would not be construed as an estate of joint tenancy
for this would defeat, rather than fulfill, the testator's or grantor's
wishes.
The Court charted its course for this area in Davis v. Davis.32
There is nothing vicious about the right of survivorship. In-
deed, it was recognized by our General Assembly in the enact-
ment of the statute relating to bank deposits. Section 7851
of the 1942 Code. No rule of law is violated by creating an
estate in two or more persons with the right of survivorship.
Section 891183 of the Code only abolished survivorship as an
incident of the common law estate of joint tenancy, and was
never intended to prevent the creation of the right of survivor-
ship when expressly provided for in a will or deed.
It then proceeded to hold that where the limitation to be construed
had expressly attempted to set up an estate of tenancy by the entirety
with attendant survivorship, which was declared abolished in South
Carolina, the intention of the testator would be preserved by constru-
ing the limitation as creating either a tenancy in common for life with
a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor or a tenancy in common
in fee simple with an executory limitation in favor of the survivor.
With this as precedent in all probability there would be a similar
holding if the Court were faced with the hypothetical limitation above
had the interests of the cotenants already vested.
As in every case, however, all is not "black and white" and as the
exception that proves the rule, there is still one area in which it
would be preferable to construe an estate one of joint tenancy rather
than of tenancy in common. In the case of an attempted conveyance
in fee simple of the interest of one cotenant to another in which no
words of inheritance were used, if the estate were one of joint tenancy
the fee would pass. If the estate were one of tenancy in common,
only a life estate would pass.34 If faced with such a situation where
32. 223 S.C. 182,75 S. E. 2d 46 (1953). -
33. COD OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA § 19-55 (1952).
34. Means, Words of Inheritance in Deeds of LIand in South Carolina; .4
Title Examiner's Guide, 5 S. C. L. Q., 326 (1953).
[Vol. 11
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the grantor's intention would be defeated by an equally antiquated
and arbitrary rule of law, the Court might be embarrassed by the
progress that it had made in destroying the evil of jus accrescendi
in the common law estate of joint tenancy. Nevertheless, in weigh-
ing the overall benefit to be derived from abolishing the rule as com-
pared with the possible detriment resulting from such an abolition
in the limited area of a release between joint tenants, there can be
no doubt that the scales tip in favor of the former.
TENANCY IN COMMON
Tenants in common hold by several and distinct titles, with unity
of possession. There may be an entire disunion of time, interest or
title; the cotenants may claim their several titles and interests from
entirely different sources; the qualities of their estates may be differ-
ent; the shares may be unequal; the modes of acquisition of title
may be unlike; and they may hold by different tenures.3 5 The estate
may be formed in an infinite variety of ways. It may be formed by
devise, 38 intestate descent,3 7 grant,3 8 adverse possession,3 9 and by
product of error or mistake in an attempt to create another form of
tenancy such as tenancy by the entirety, 40 to name those that come
readily to mind. The only requirement to form the estate is that
there be unity of possession. 4 '
OUSTER
In tenancy in common, each tenant in common with his cotenant
has the right to the possession of the premises and the possession
of one tenant is the possession of all. This ceases to be true from
the moment that such possession'by a tenant in common becomes
adverse to the co-owners. 42 The problem is, when does such posses-
sion become adverse? This may be answered by saying, when there
has been an ouster. The next determination that is necessary is
clearly then, what constitutes ouster? The Court in Jeffcoat v.
Knotts4 3 described it thus:
It is not necessary to constitute ouster that there should be for-
cible ejection of the tenant or a forcible hindrance of his entry.
35. 86 C. J. S., Tenancy its Common § 4 (1954).
36. Ex Parte Johnson, 147 S. C. 259, 145 S. E. 113 (1928).
37. Rabb v. Aiken, 2 McCord Eq. 118 (S. C. 1827).
38. Green v. Cannady, 77 S. C. 193 57 S. E. 832 (1907).
39. Dorn v. Beasley, 7 Rich. Eq. 84 (S. C. 1854).
40. Davis v. Davis, 223 S. C. 182, 75 S. E. 2d 46 (1953),
41. TrFvFxy, Rn.Az PRoPERTY § 426 (3rd ed. 1939).
42. Wells v. Coursey, 197 S. C. 483,15 S. E. 2d 752 (1941).
43. 13 Rich. 50 (S. C. 1860).
19591
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Refusal of his right, attended by circumstances showing deter-
mination of the disseizor to resort to physical force if necessary,
is sufficient proof of ouster.
This rule seems to have been modified by later holdings which fail
to mention physical force or readiness to resort to it, but require
only that the possession be actual, exclusive, hostile and uninterrupt..
ed.4
4
Even this adds little to the determination of when possession be.
comes adverse. The only practical method of determination is to
attempt to break down and classify the cases in this area.
There seems to be a distinction made between adverse possession
and presumption of a grant where continued, uninterrupted posses-
sion, with the appropriation of the rents and profits, are the only
manifestations of ouster. In situations where possession was for
less than twenty years but greater than ten years the Court refused
to find adverse possession. On the other hand when possession wa;
for longer than twenty years the Court has found little difficulty il
finding a presumption of a grant. In Gray v. Givens45 it was held
that mere exclusive possession by one tenant in common for less than
twenty years would not bar the cotenants. This rule was strengthen-
ed in McGee v. Hall4 6 by the holding that exclusive receipt and
appropriation of the rents and profits by one tenant in common would
not constitute an ouster of the cotenants, nor would an ouster be
presumed short of twenty years. On the other hand the Court in
Powers v. Smith4 7 and Wells v. Coursey,48 upon a finding that the
claimants assumed sole conduct and management of the property and
paid taxes for a greater period than twenty years, held that the
occupancy was actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and uninterrupted
and constituted an ouster from which title vested in the occupants.
Continuous possession for a period greater than twenty years with
an appropriation of all of the rents and profits, however, creates only
a rebuttable presumption of ouster.4 9
It is clear that the act of grantees taking possession under a deed
amounts to an ouster of other tenants and commences the running
44. Wells v. Coursey, spra.
45. 2 Hill's Eq. 511 (S. C. 1837).
46. 26 S. C. 179, 1 S. E. 711 (1887).
47. 80 S. C. 110, 61 S. E. 222 (1908).
48. Note 42, supra.
49. Whitaker v. Jeffcoat, 128 S. C. 404, 122 S. E. 495 (1924); Powers v.
Smith, 80 S. C. 110, 61 S. E. 222 (1908).
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of the statute.50 If, however, a grantee takes possession under a
deed, fraudulently altered to give himself full title, such possession
does not commence the running of the statute until discovery, by the
aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud ;51 nor may such
possession be tacked to the possession of an innocent grantee in com-
puting the twenty year period necessary to constitute a presumption
of a grant.5 2
If the deed vests the grantee with only the undivided interest of
some of the tenants in common, and puts him on notice of the interest
of the claims of others, on the other hand, his entry is not an ouster
of the remaining tenants and he becomes a tenant in common with
them. 5 3
One area that is not clear is whether there is an ouster where a
grantee takes possession under a deed ostensibly conveying the entire
fee, but the grantee has knowledge of the true state of the title. By
analogy with the case of the fraudulent alteration of a deed, it should
not. Even if the grantor conveyed in good faith, the adverse occu-
pancy by the grantee with knowledge that the grantor had no such
title to convey would be closely akin to a fraudulent act against the
cotenants.
The one distinctive feature of every co-tenancy is the right of
each tenant, in common with his co-tenants, to the possession of
the premises held in common. An immediate and necessary
corollary to this rule is the principle that the possession of one
tenant in common is the possession of all. His sole occupancy of
the common property is entirely consistent with the existence of
the co-tenancy and a full recognition of the rights of his co-
tenant to enter and share the possession with him at any time.
In the absence, therefore, of facts showing that he holds posses-
sion of the premises in opposition to such rights in his co-tenants,
his occupancy will be presumed to be that of a tenant in common,.
recognizing the co-tenancy.54
The logic distinguishing the holding that the statute commences
to run when a grantee enters under a deed that purports to convey
the entire fee, and not permitting it to run where there is fraud, is
50. McIntosh v. Kolb, 112 S. C. 1, 99 S. H. 356 (1919) ; Suddath v. Summer-
al, 61 S. C. 276, 39 S. E. 534, 85 Am. St. Rep. 883 (1901) ; Odom v. Weathers-
bee, 26 S. C. 244, 1 S. E. 890 (1897).
51. Garvin v. Garvin, 40 S. C. 435, 19 S. . 79 (1894).
52. Weston v. Morgan, 162 S. C. 177, 160 S. E. 436 (1931).
53. Knotts v. Joiner, 217 S. C. 99, 59 S. E. 2d 850 (1950).
54. Wells v. Coursey, 197 S. C. 483, 15 S. E. 2d 752 (1941).
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expressed in the following quotation from Livingston z. Peru Iron
Co. :55
'A disseisin, it is said, may commence by force or fraud; an
adverse possession may commence by force, but, I apprehend,
not by fraud, as, for instance, under a deed obtained by fraud
or by forgery. The person guilty of the fraud or forgery cannot
rely upon such a deed as conveying a valid title; and the argu-
ments which have gone the greatest length in favor of adverse
possession, have proceeded on the ground that the possessor
relied on his title, and believed the property which he possessed
to be his own. A man may think himself the true owner under
-claim of title; that is an adverse possession; but if, with a full
Towledge that such property belongs to another, a person pro-
cures a forged deed, and enters under that, what is the quo
-aninmo? Is it an intent to enjoy his own, or to defraud another?
And it has been often said and decided that the fact of possession
:and the quo animo the possession was taken, are the only tests.
If the quo animo is a bona fide intention to enjoy his own proper-
ty, that intent can never exist where the possessor knows the
property is not his own. If by the quo aninto is meant an inten-
tion to appropriate the property to his own use, right or wrong,
then, indeed, is the possession of almost all intruders adverse.'
Another area in which occupancy by one tenant has been construed
as an ouster of the others is where the property is essentially a unit
and incapable of separate occupancy and the occupant uses such
property for his individual enterprise.5 6
The ouster of one tenant, however, is not necessarily the ouster of
all. It is possible for adverse possession to be obtained against one
tenant and not.another, as where the possessor held permissively of
,one cotenant and hostilely to the others.57 Also where there is a pre-
sumption of a grant, the disability of one cotenant will not inure to
the benefit of the others. 58 This rule, however, does not apply to
adverse possession.
5 9
Neither mere declarations nor intent to hold adversely are of any
consequence in establishing adverse possession. The character of
55. 9 Wend. 511 (N. Y. 1832). Quoted in the dissenting opinion of Weston
'. Morgan, supra.
56. Annely v. De Saussure, 26 S. C. 497, 2 S. E. 490, 4 Am. St. Rep. 725
<(1887).
57. Metz v. Metz, 48 S. C. 472,26 S. F. 787 (1897).
58. Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28,26 S. E. 3 (1896).
59. Metz v. Metz, supra. The reasoning behind this distinction is analyzed
in 10 S. C. L. Q. 292 (1958).
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the possession in itself must be hostile in order that it may be deemed
adverse. 60 In fact declarations of hostile possession by the claimant
are generally inadmissible into evidence in support of proof of
ouster. 6 ' It is, however, permissible to introduce such declarations
in rebuttal to evidence, introduced by the opposing party under the
admissions exception to the hearsay rule, of other statements made
by the adverse claimant to the effect that his occupation was per-
missive.62
PARTITION
... partition is a right much favored, upun the ground that
it not only secures peace, but promotes industry and enterprise,
that each should have his own. The mere difficulty of effecting
it is not regarded as a sufficient reason for refusing to grant
it.63
Under the early common law of England, the right to partition was
confined exclusively to lands held in parcenary. As parceners acquir-
ed title by inheritance only, the right to partition extended only to
estates in fee. 64 This remedy was extended under Statutes of 31
and 32 Henry VIII to joint tenancies and tenancies in common of
estates of inheritance, of freehold or for years. The Code provisions
in §§ 10-2201 through 10-221065 are statutory authority for .parti-
tion in South Carolina, with § 10-2201 being a recognition of the
common law, as modified and extended under the statutes of 31 and
32 Henry VIII.66
As a general rule, every cotenant may demand partition as a
matter of right if there is a present right to possession.6 7 If all of
the parties are sui juris, partition can be had at any time that they
agree to it without resort to legal action. 68 Where, however, there
is disagreement between them or one or more of them are suffering
under a disability, then there must be a resort to the law.
The Court of Common Pleas has exclusive jurisdiction over all
partition proceedings. 6 9 Upon the filing of a bill for partition, a
writ is issued to the commissioners, who are appointed in conformity
60. Quoted from 1 R. C. L. 704 in the trial court's decree which was approved
by the Court in Weston v. Morgan, 162 S. C. 177, 160 S. E. 436 (1931).
61. Wingo v. Caldwell, 36 S. C. 598, 15 S. E. 382 (1892).
62. Metz v. Metz, supra.
63. Cannon v. Lomax, 29 S. C. 369, 7 S. R. 529 (1888).
64. 21 Am. & ENG. ENcy. OF LAws 1145.
65. Con OF LAws OF SouTH CAROLINA (1952).
66. S. C. Savings Bank v. Stansell, 160 S. C. 81, 158 S. E. 131 (1931).
67. S. C. Savings Bank v. Stansell, smpra.
68. Charleston, C. & C. R. Co. v. Leach, 33 S. C. 175, 11 S. E. 631 (1890).
69. CODn OF LAws OF SouTH CAROLINA § 10-2205 (1952).
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with § 10-2206,7o to determine whether or not the land can be
partitioned in kind without prejudice to any of the parties; and if
not, to determine whether or not it should be sold at public auction
with a division of the proceeds among the parties according to their
rights, or to be delivered over to one or more of the parties interested
therein upon the payment of a sum of money to be assessed by the
commissioners. 71 The Court is not under obligation to have com-
missioners appointed, however, where it is apparent from the evidence
that there cannot be partition in kind. It may order sale as an
expense-saving measure to the cotenants. 72 But where a sale is
made under partition proceedings, it is not a compulsory sale under
process of execution and the doctrine of caveat emptor does not
apply.73
The commissioners have the duty to make known their findings
to the Court which "shall proceed to consider and determine same.
'"74
If it is the decision of the commissioners, and the Court so orders,
that there should be a delivery of the lands to one or more of the
cotenants, title does not vest until the money is paid by them to the
other tenants. The order of the Court requiring that the property
be turned over to one or more of the cotenants is a judgment on
which a scire facias may issue, on the return of which execution may
be had or an order obtained directing that the land be sold to satisfy
the judgment7 5
Once, however, the return is made, the Court cannot alter it.
There is no course left open to the parties or the Court but to accept
it or to have it set aside. A return can be set aside if there is a show-
ing of mistake, fraud, or corruption. 76 The return of a majority
of the commissioners is sufficient, 77 and there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the commissioners acted impartially.
78
1. PARTItS
All cotenants are necessary parties to partition proceedings and if
one or more of them are not made parties, the proceedings are not
binding upon them ;79 but where a cotenant has conveyed his interest
70. CODE or LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952).
71. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-2208 (1952).
72. CODz OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-2201 (1952).
73. Bolivar v. Ziegler, 9 S. C. 287 (1878).
74. CODE op LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-2208 (1952).
75. Burris v. Gooch, 5 Rich. 1 (S. C. 1851).
76. Buckler v. Farrow, Rich. Eq. Cas. 178 (S. C. 1832).
77. Yates v. Gridley, 16 S. C. 496 (1882).
78. Riley v. Gaines, 14 S. C. 454 (1881).
79. Johnson v. Payne, 1 Hill 111 (S. C. 1833); CODV or LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA § 10-2201 (1952).
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to another, the grantor does not have to be joined in the action as
the grantee becomes a cotenant, accruing all rights and title of the
grantor.8 0
A judgment creditor does not have to be made a party to partition
proceedings, 8 ' but it is the better policy to do so. 8 2 He can only
come in under the distributee whose interest he acquired and since
his distributee's share is subject to the paramount right of partition,
title passes to the vendee clear of his claims.8 s The judgment
creditor may, by timely application to the Court, however, have his
lien protected by an order for the payment to him of the judgment
debtor's distributive share of the price of the land.8 4 On the other
hand, if the land is sold before any proceeding is had for partition,
the purchaser acquires the title and stands in place of the distributee
as a cotenant. In such a status he becomes a necessary party to the
partition proceedings.8 5
Tenants in common may mortgage their undivided interest in
realty and a mortgagee of such undivided interest is a necessary
party to a partition proceeding. The rationalization of the distinction
between making the mortgagee a necessary party and not requiring
that a judgment creditor be made one is that whereas a judgment
creditor has only a general lien on the property of the debtor, a
mortgagee has a specific lien on the undivided share of the property
to be partitioned. Though a mortgage does not convey any legal
estate to the mortgagee, it does create an equitable interest which
should be protected in a partition suit and the only adequate way
that this can be done is by making the mortgagee a party.8 6
One party cannot convey an easement in the common property
without the consent of all cotenants. Any such conveyance will
affect only his undivided interest.8 7 I-ntry by the grantee of the
easement onto the common property, however, is not a technical
trespass, but the grantee is accountable for all damages to the co-
tenants' interests caused by such entry.8 8 In addition, the owner
of the easement is a necessary party to partition proceedings and a
failure to make a grantee a party, where his rights are prejudiced
thereby, is grounds for opening the judgment. The Court in its de-
80. McNish v. Guerard, 4 Strob. Eq. 66 (S. C. 1850).
81. Keckeley v. Moore, 2 Strob. Eq. 21 (S. C. 1848).
82. Ex parte Johnson, 147 S. C. 259, 145 S. E. 113 (1928).
83. Keckeley v. Moore, 2 Strob. Eq. 21 (S. C. 1848); Rabb v. Aiken, 2
McCord Eq. 118 (S. C. 1827).
84. Burris v. Gooch, 5 Rich. 1 (S. C. 1851).
85. Burris v. Gooch, supra.
86. Ex parte Johnson, 147 S. C. 259, 145 S. E. 113 (1928).
87. Foster v. Foster, 81 S. C. 307, 62 S. E. 320 (1908).
88. Williams v. Bruton. 121 S. C. 30.113 S. E. 319 (1922).
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cree will then require that the grantee be made a party and issue a
writ commanding the commissioners to protect, if practical, the inter-
est of such grantee by assigning to the granting tenant that portion
of the property burdened with the easement.80
When a husband acquired title to land as a tenant in common with
others his seizin is subject to the paramount right of his cotenants
to demand partition and therefore his wife's dower, attaching to the
seizin, is subordinate to such paramount right. If there is an enforced
sale under decree of the Court, her inchoate right of dower in the
land is defeated even though she was not a party to the action. The
same applies where the husband sells his undivided share without a
release of dower and the land is subsequently partitioned. Since
the wife's interest is subservient to the paramount right of partition,
her right is defeated by the partition because the vendee's rights
were derived from her husband, the vendor, and are subject to the
same limitations as to partition.90 But when partition is partition
in kind, then the wife's dower attaches to the part set off to her
husband or to her husband's grantee.9'
2. WHO MAY DEMAND PARTITION
Obviously cotenants in possession may demand partition.02 In
addition, a judgment creditor or other person purchasing at an execu-
tion sale, the debtor's undivided interest in the land becomes a co-
tenant in his stead and so acquires his rights to partition.s Also
the grantee of an easement has the right to force the grantor to have
partition made of the lands to protect his grant,0 4 but even though
partition is ordered at the insistence of the grantee, he is not really
the plaintiff and has no right to name the commissioners allocated to
the plaintiff.95
Partition will not be allowed, however, where the cotenancy rela-
tionship arises out of an illegal transaction.96 In addition, a suit
89. Ex parte Union Mfg. & Pwr. Co., 81 S. C. 265, 62 S. B. 259 (1908).
90. Holley v. Glover, 36 S. C. 404, 15 S. R. 605 (1892).
91. Gaffney v. Jefferies, 59 S. C. 565, 38 S. R. 216 (1901).
92. CoDn or LAWS oF Souna CAROLINA § 10-2201 (1952).
93. Burris v. Gooch, supra.
94. Charleston C. & C. R. Co. v. Leech, 33 S. C. 175, 11 S. B. 631 (1890).
95. Charleston C. & C. R. Co. v. Leech, supra.
96. In Milhous v. Sally, 43 S. C. 318, 21 S. R. 268 (1895), the children of
an insolvent intestate agreed that his lands should be sold under a judgment
held by the intestate's widow as assignee, for the use of the widow for life
and then for themselves as a scheme to defraud other creditors and save the
land for the family. The bidding was chilled by representing that the land
was being purchased for the benefit of the family and as a result it was sold
for an amount substantially below its real value, and in fact no money was
ever paid to the judgment creditor. The land was taken in the names of
several of the children and upon the death of the widow the remainder of
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for partition will not be sustained where the testator directs that his
estate remain undivided for a reasonable length of time,9 7 but § 10-
220198 states a rule of public policy and where a limitation sets undue
restrictions on partition it will be held void as an. unreasonable limita-
tion on the power of alienation. 9 9
3. RIGHTS OP R.E MAINDIRAiN As To PARTITION
The rights of remaindermen as to partition have been determined
by fou.r cases. To adequately describe and distinguish these cases by
words alone needlessly complicates this area by requiring the reader
to perform mental gymnastics in attempting to visualize and compare
the necessarily lengthy descriptions of the estates involved. Irk an
attempt to alleviate this problem, the diagrammatic form of presenta-
tion has been combined with that of the written description. The block
represents the fee estate of the property involved. The individual
cotenants' undivided holdings are represented by the areas blocked
off by the dotted lines. The vertical lines are spaced so as to denote
the percentage of the estate owned by each tenant and the horizontal,
lines separate the possessory estates from the remainder interests.
While the vertical lines are scaled to show the proportionate interest
of each tenant, for purposes of simplification, no such attempt has
been made to indicate by scale the proportionate interests as between
possessory tenants and remaindermen but rather the horizontat
lines have been placed mid-way the block merely to indicate the
existence of the two interests. The holdings of the petitioners
for partition are denoted by the cross-hatched areas.
The question as to rights of remaindennen to demand partition,
seems first to have arisen in Lorick & Lovrance v. McCreery. eo
In this case there were three tenants in common, two of whom were
seized of undivided shares of the fee and the third of whom was
seized of a life estate. The holder of the remainder interest of the
life estate prayed for partition and this was resisted by the tenants.
in possession.
the children petitioned for partition. The Court, in sustaining a demurrer,
stated that the plaintiffs stood on precisely the same footing as the defendants
in this fraud upon their ancestor's creditors, except that the defendants were
in possession and applied the maxim "Ex dolo inalo non oritur actio". (no
action can arise out of fraud)
97. Callahan v. Callahan, 36 S. C. 454, 15 S. E. 727 (1892)
98. "All joint tenants and tenants in common who hold, jointly or in common,
for a term of life or years or of whom one has an estate for a term of life or
years with the other that has an estate of inheritance or freehold in any lands,
tenements or hereditaments shall be compellable to make severance and partition
of all such lands, tenements and hereditaments."
99. McCravey v. Otts, 90 S. C. 447,74 S. E. 142 (1911).
100. 20 S. C. 424 (1884).
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The Court, with very little discussion, and no mention of authority,
ruled that such action should be carried out if it could be done con-
sistently with the interests of all parties and without detriment
to the interests and claims of the life tenant. In other words, the
petitioner's interest would still be subject to the life estate with which
it was incumbered.
In the case of Cannon v. Lomax-01 the problem again faced the
Court. There a common ancestor had leased the property to two of
three heirs. Upon the death of the ancestor intestate, the third heir,
instituted partition proceedings. It was held that the petitioner, not
in possession because of the outstanding lease in the hands of the
other cotenants, could not maintain an action for partition until the
lease expired.
tr% ,.
The Lorick decision was not mentioned and was apparently over-
looked when the rule was handed down that "partition is the right to
a severance, when there is rightful unity not only of title, but of
possession" (writer's emphasis). Though there is a superficial similar-
ity between the relation of the parties here and Lorick supra, it is
readily apparent that here the remainderman-petitioner did not possess
the remainder interest of a specific undivided share of the possessory
estate as he did in the former case.
The next time that the Court had this issue presented was in Varn
v. Varn.'02 Here there was a joint tenancy for life with remainder-
men holding as tenants in common. The petitioner purchased the
interest of some of the remaindermen and after the death of several
of the life tenants, he prayed for partition. At this time he was not
only the owner of an undivided share of the fee which was incumber-
101. 29 S. C. 369,7 S. E. 529 (1888).
102. 32 S. C. 77. 10 S. E. 829 (1890).
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ed by a life estate but was also an owner of an undivided share of the
fee not so incumbered.
Ra9'~I I I I I4 - II I ~
I I j
I~~ ,' I , ,
This latter interest seems to have brought him within the rule an-
nounced in Cannon v. Lomnaz as to the unity of possession, but the
Court made no mention of case or statutory authority in arriving at
their decision to enforce partition. In the proceedings, however,
such portions as the life tenants were entitled to were to be set off
for their possession and enjoyment, thereby leaving the remainder
interest of these shares undivided until the termination of the life
estates.
It was not until the case of S. C. Savings Bank v. Stansell a0 3 that
an attempt was made to rationalize the former decisions dealing
with the right of a remainderman to demand partition. In this case
the petitioner was the owner of the life estate and four of the ten
undivided shares of the reversion.
- i.....,.,..,.,.., II
0.1; M r-
Partition was permitted on the theory that since the petitioner was
the owner of the life estate as well as the owner of undivided shares
of the fee, it could consent, as owner of the particular estate, to its
partition demands as owner of undivided shares of the fee.
It was pointed out that at common law, in the absence of statutory
authority, partition cannot be maintained as between life tenants and
remaindermen which includes the situation where the petitioner owns
a moiety of both the life estate and the reversion. After a detailed
discussion of this principle the Court said: "It is clear, from the
foregoing general principles, that the plaintiff in this case, in the
absence of statutory authorization, could not maintain its action in
partition."
103. 160 S. C. 81, 158 S. E. 131 (1931).
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At this point the Court exercised its judicial license by stating that
§ 10-22011o4 had long been in existence when the previous cases
had been decided "and no doubt the Court had it in mind in reaching
the conclusion in each case." By using § 10-2201 as statutory authority
for permitting partition by a life tenant or a remainderman and the
previous cases as construing the statute, the Court proceeded to ana-
lyze each of the preceding cases and to interpret their holdings as a
construction of this section. The results were: a remainderman may
maintain a suit for partition to have the portion in which he holds the
fee severed from the undivided interests not incumbered by the life
estate if it can be done without detriment to the interests and claims
of the life tenant; a remainderman may not maintain a suit for
partition where the entire property is incumbered by a particular
estate and the petitioner is not entitled to immediate possession even
though the owner of the particular estate has an undivided interest
in fee in the property; but a remainderman may maintain a suit for
partition where the entire property is incumbered by a particular
estate, even though he is not entitled to immediate possession, where
the life tenant consents to such partition.
£cMIr LL4vc: V4
AJj -I 2.
i ;i i , , , ] I; i ,i , \1 1i "
I. & II l, ,,
I N , g..il '
In recapitulation, by comparing the diagrams of each of the four
cases, the rule in this area seems to be that where there is a right to
104. CoDm or LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952). "All joint tenants and
tenants in common who hold, jointly or in common, for a term of life or years
or of whom one has an estate for a term of life or years with the other that
has an estate of inheritance or freehold in any lands, tenements or hereditaments
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possession, even though there are remainder interests involved,
partition can be had as to the possessory estates. There also appears
to be an absolute right to partition vested in both the remainder and
life interests where the remainder interest is of a specific undivided
share of the estate as in diagram number one. This right to partition
extends only to enforcing partition of the undivided interest, con-
sisting of both the possessory and remainder estates, from the remain-
ing portions of the estate and not to partitioning the remainder from
the possessory interest.' 0 5 But even if the entire fee is incumbered
by a life estate, if the life tenant acquiesces, a remainderman may
enforce partition of the remainder interests as in diagram number
four.
Once it is determined that a suit for partition can be had it is up
to the discretion of the commissioners as to the feasibility of partition-
ing in kind or of disposing of the property and partitioning the pro-
ceeds among the cotenants according to their interests. Where there
is a remainder interest and the latter course of action is decided upon
by the commissioners, the usual procedure is that the property is sold
and the proceeds of the sale are invested and the possessory tenant
is paid the income derived therefrom until the termination of the
particular estate. But upon consent of all parties, the value of the
possessory estate may be computed from the earning power of the
proceeds for the term of the estate or of the life expectancy of the
life tenant, in the case of a life estate, and from this sum the cash
value of the possessory estate is computed. The balance of the pro-
ceeds is then divided among the remaindermen according to their
interests.' 0 6
CONV4YAN, MORTGAGE, AND RIGHT To HOMEsTEAD oF AN
UNDIVIDED SHARE
As a general rule, a cotenant can only convey or mortgage his
undivided share of the land. A conveyance by one of the tenants
to a stranger of a definite portion of the common property by metes
and bounds, however, is not void, but will not be permitted to operate
to the prejudice of the other cotenants. Where such conveyance
does not exceed in value or acreage the grantor's share, it will operate
as a conveyance of the grantor's undivided interest in the entire
estate. Under proceedings for partition of the estate, the portion
105. Separation of the possessory and remainder interests is not partition
for the relationship between ovners of these interests is not that of cotenants
but rather that of life tenant and remainderman. Such a division, therefore, is
controlled by the principles applicable to that relationship.
106. S. C. Savings Bank v. Stansell, 160 S. C. 81, 158 S. E. 131 (1931).
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ostensibly conveyed will be alloted to the grantee if this can be done
without prejudice to the interests of the other cotenants. 1 0 7  A
mortgagee has the same rights to have his mortgage protected where
he mistakenly takes a mortgage on a section of undivided realty
described by metes and bounds where partition is sought by one or
more of the cotenants.'-o
Where there is a question of homestead, it should not be assigned
prior to partitioning the land' 0 9 nor should proceedings be maintained
for partition and homestead at the same time." 0 Where land is
partitioned at the insistence of judgment creditors, the Court has no
power to assign a homestead out of an undivided interest in real estate
and such attempt is a nullity. But where the interests of the parties can
be protected, partition may be ordered as to give to such tenant, for
his share, that portion of the land which included the homestead so
admeasured.21 Where, on the other hand, a judgment creditor de-
mands partition in the lands of a deceased debtor, a homestead in
his lands must be assigned to the widow and all of the children,
even though ,the children are emancipated and heads of families of
their own and such homestead is subject to immediate partition
among the members of the family."
2
ACCOUNTING OV RENTS AND PROVITS
At common law joint tenants or tenants in common had no remedy
against their cotenants for accounting of rents and profits received
from the undivided estate. Parliament, with the enactment of 4 and
5 Anne, chapter 16, modified this rule and permitted an action of
account against the tenant who had received more than his aliquot
share of the proceeds from the estate. Equity restricted this action
to cases where rent was received and denied relief in cases of exclu-
sive occupation of the common estate, where there was no actual
receipt of rents. South Carolina has broadened the area of relief
to include the latter as well as the former." 3
By rents and profits, it is not meant the rental value of the land, but
only profits made or rents actually received by the occupying tenant
from portions of land occupied in excess of his interests.11 4 But
rental value of the land may be received in evidence to establish a
107. Young v. Edwards, 33 S. C. 404, 11 S. E. 1066 (1890).
108. Kennedy v. Boykin, 35 S. C. 61, 14 S. E. 809 (1892).
109. Mellichamp v. Mellichamp, 28 S. C. 125, 5 S. E. 333 (1888).
110. Williams v. Malloy, 33 S. C. 601, 11 S. E. 1066 (1890).
111. Mellichamp v. Mellichamp, supra.
112. Ex parte Worley, 54 S. C. 208, 32 S. E. 307 (1899).
113. Corbett v. Laurens, 5 Rich. Eq. 301 (1853).
114. Griffin v. Griffin, 82 S. C. 256, 64 S. E. 160 (1909).
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basis of computing a reasonable value to be attributed to rents and
profits where there is no evidence as to actual rents or profits
available.' 5
The rule as to rents and profits applies only where the occupying
tenant has not committed an ouster of his cotenants. If there has
been an ouster, then the occupying tenant has committed a trespass
and is liable for the actual rental value of the ousted tenants'
shares.3 6
Of course the above rules do not prevent one tenant in common
from becoming the landlord of another by way of lease. Where
such contractual relationship exists, the general rules of landlord
and tenant apply and the lessor may distrain for his rent. 7
Until recently an area of uncertainty existed in assessing rents
and profits and prorating each tenant's share in partition where the
occupying tenant had improved the undivided premises without the
express or implied consent of his cotenants. The general rule is that
one man has no right to improve the land of another at the owner's
expense.328 Originally this rule was construed that as between
cotenants, the occupying tenant was liable for the rent of so much of
the premises in excess of his undivided portion as was capable of
producing rent at the time that he took possession, but he was not
liable for rents and profits received from such excess share as was
rendered capable by his labor since the non-participating tenant did
not have to share in the cost of the improvements." 09
This rule was changed by subsequent cases to one holding that an
equitable accounting for rents and profits permits the occupying
tenant to set-off against such rents and profits charged to him the
amount that the value of the premises was increased by such un-
authorized improvements, as contrasted with the cost of the improve-
ments to the occupying tenant, and the rents and profits should be
regarded as paid and discharged pro tanto by the increased value
which may have been imparted to the premises by the improve-
ments.' 20
In order to qualify for this set-off, however, the tenant had to show
that hardship would result from depriving him of the set-off and
that such set-off could be made consistently with the equity of the
115. Cain v. Cain, 53 S. C. 350, 31 S. E. 278, 69 Am. St. Rep. 863 (1898).
116. Jones v. Massey, 14 S. C. 292 (1880).
117. Luther v. Arnold, 8 Rich. 24, 62 Am. Dec. 422 (S. C. 1854).
118. Thompson v. Bostick, McMul. Eq. 75 (S. C. 1840).
119. Hancock v. Day, McMul. Eq. 69, 36 Am. Dec. 293 (S. C. 1840).
120. Buck v. Martin, 21 S. C. 590, 53 Am. Rep. 702 (1884); Scaife v.
Thompson, 15 S. C. 337 (1881).
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cotenants.' 21 In addition to set-off for rents and profits, this rule
applied to partition also. If the occupying tenant's improvenents
met the above qualifications, the value of the improvements were not
considered in computing the value of the land for partition, and, if
it could be equitably done, the improving tenant would be awarded
the portion of the land that he improved. If no partition could be
had, then the improving party would be compensated for the value
of the improvements before the cotenants received their proportionate
share.' 2
2
The cases disclose three areas where there was sufficient "hard-
ship" to bring the improving tenant within the exception of the rule:
(1) where the occupying tenant made the improvement under the
mistaken impression that he was the sole owner of the undivided
fee.' 23 (Where, however, parties in possession of land, under claim
of title, make improvements upon such land after action has been
brought against them for the possession of the land, they have no
right to the value of the improvements so erected) ;124 (2) where
the improvements were necessary for the use and enjoyment of all
of the cotenants;125 and (3) where the improvements were made
with the implied or express consent of the other cotenants. 120
In Sutton v. Sutton'2 7 the Court appeared to discard the necessity
of a showing of hardship by the following statement:
It is not claimed that this case falls under any of the exceptions
above indicated, but it seems to us when one of the cotenants
made improvements which add to the value of the common
property, and at the same time is chargeable with rents and
profits, that it would be equitable to regard the rents and profits
as paid and discharged pro tanto by the increased value which
may have been imparted to the premises by the improvements.
Although the quoted portion cites only the charging off of rents and
profits pro tanto with the amount that the occupying tenant improved
the premises, the point that the Court was dealing with was an
exception taken to a ruling by the trial court that in the event of a
sale, the tenant was not entitled to the value of his improvements
out of the proceeds of the sale, before, distribution to the cotenants.
It is therefore apparent that the Court intended to extend this rule,
121. Buck v. Martin, supra.
122. Buck v. Martin, supra.
123. Annely v. DeSaussure, 17 S. C. 391 (1881).
124. Johnson v. Harrelson, 18 S. C. 604 (1882).
125. Buck v. Martin, supra.
126. Buck v. Martin, suPta.
127. 26 S. C. 33 (1886).
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not only to rents and profits, but also to the sale of the premises and
the subsequent division of the proceeds. In addition, further on in
the same paragraph the Court said:
Our courts have enforced the doctrine that, in making partition,
the improved part shall, if practicable, be assigned to the im-
proving tenant.
It is true that the above quotation was dictum but is was used to
demonstrate the logic of extending the rule for not requiring a show-
ing of hardship to cases where there was to be no partition but there
were equitable considerations present for compensating the improv-
ing tenant for the improvements that he made. From the language
it is apparent that the Court meant to eliminate the necessity for
showing hardship in all three areas where the unauthorized improv-
ing tenant was seeking reimbursement for his improvements.
The Court subsequently appeared to abandon the Sutton rule. It
was not, however, at the time faced with the problem where the out-
come of the case hinged only on the finding of hardship within one
of the three previously listed definitions. In Cain v. Cain,l2s the
Court enunciated the rule as requiring a showing of hardship but
under the facts of the case "hardship" was present. In Guignard v.
Corley'2 9 the old rule was again cited, but in this instance only by
way of dictum.
In the Bank of Swansea v. Rucker,1 3 0 however, in spite of the
factual situation coming within the "hardship" rule the Court seemed
to veer back to the Sutton rule. There the Court was faced with
the rights of a purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure of the improving
tenant's undivided interest where the improving tenant had made
the improvements under the mistaken belief that she owned the un-
divided fee. In holding that the interests of the other cotenants were
not prejudiced by the allotment of the improved portion to the pur-
chaser, the Court had a clear case of hardship under the previous
definition. It did not acknowledge the hardship rule however, but
advanced what was essentially the Sutton rule:
The rule appears well settled in this State that the right of
a cotenant in possession of the common property to be reimbursed
for improvements made by him, or in the partition to have the
portion of the land improved by him alloted to him, is ex-
ceptional, and to maintain it the improving tenant must establish:
128. 53 S. C. 850, 31 S. E. 278,69 Am. St. Rep. 863 (1898).
129. 147 S. C. 12, 144 S. E. 586 (1928).
130. 156 S. C.29, 152S. E. 712 (1930).
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(1) That he was in possession under an honest belief of owner-
ship; or (2) that to disallow his claim would be inequitable;
and (3) that the allowance would result in no inequity to the
interests of his cotenants.
The Sutton rule has recently been again reaffirmed in the case of
Shumaker v. Shunakerl3 1 in which there were no factual findings
which could bring it within the "hardship" definition. The remainder-
men cotenants had consented to the sale of timber on the land for the
purpose of constructing a home for their mother, the life tenant.
The funds so raised were insufficient for this purpose and one of
the cotenants who resided with the life tenant used his own money, as
well as furnished his labor, to complete the home without getting
consent from the other cotenants. Upon the termination of the life
estate, partition proceedings were filed and the improving tenant
cross-filed for 'eimbursement for the value of his labor in building
the home plus the money that he expended in its construction.18 2 In
arriving at its holding that the defendant was entitled to reimburse-
ment, the Court did not require any showing of hardship but looked
only to the equity of the case:
The betterments or improvements are directly attributable to
the proceeds of the sale of timber, contributed by all, together
with the defendant's contribution of money and labor, resulting
in the enhancement of the value of the property. To deny de-
fendant a proportionate reimbursement will result in his contribu-
tion being thrown into the common pot, although improvements,
which were useful and necessary to the enjoyment of the proper-
ty and permanent in nature, were made in good faith without
any design to injure or exclude others who were similarly situat-
ed. This would result in an inequity in that plaintiffs would be
unjustly enriched.
In light of an evaluation of the cases discussed above, the Court
seems to have definitely abandoned the need of showing hardship
and adopted the Sutton rule, which, in this writer's opinion, is the
more equitable one. It completely protects the other cotenants as
the improving tenant can: only set-off the amount that his labor
increased the value of the property by what rents or profits are
acquired because of such increase; be reimbursed the amount that
131. 108 S. E. 2d 682 (S. C. 1959).
132. The acknowledged measure of reimbursement is not the amount epend-
ed but rather the amount that the improvements have increased the value of
the property. Buck v. Martin, note 119 supra.
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the improvements increased the value of the property; or be awarded,
as his proportionate share of the unimproved property, the portion
containing the improvements, if such can be equitably done. This
would leave the cotenants, with at worst, the value of their original
unimproved interests. They cannot, by this rule, be "improved"
out of their interests and if in fact a disposition cannot be made
which will be equitable to the cotenants, and at the same time protect
the interest of the improving tenant, then the cotenants' interests
will be paramount. In addition there is some degree of protection
to the improving tenant which prevents unjust enrichment at his
expense and to his injury.
This rule, however, does not apply where a trespasser places im-
provements on property and subsequently acquires an interest of one
of the cotenants. The conveyance does not relate back to the date
of the improvements. Such improvements, at the time of erection
passes to all of the tenants in common and the subsequent conveyance
by one of them passes only his interest in the general estate, augment-
ed by the unwarranted improvements.
133
HAROLD W. JACOBS.
133. Guignard v. Corley, supra.
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